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Introduction 
 
As one of the original architects of left realism, Roger Matthews is too well-known for us to 
have to outline his many achievements and his influence on the discipline. We assume that 
the readers of this special issue know his work well. Instead of doffing our caps and writing 
an anodyne and congratulatory review, we want to focus on the claims Matthews makes in 
this book and what can be drawn from them to drive our discipline forward. This is, after all, 
how one treats an intellectual with respect: not by withholding critical judgement and 
genuflecting politely but by taking the broad realist position he represents seriously and, in 
the act of criticising it, working to keeping it alive and operational.  
 
In order to contextualise Matthews’ book we must first say a few words about the condition 
of contemporary criminology. For us, theoretical criminology has almost ground to a 
complete standstill. There have been a few interesting contributions to existing positions in 
recent years but the general trend is quite clear. Criminologists these days seem doomed to 
repeat ideas from the twentieth century, and there appears to be a pronounced fear of actually 
hatching new ideas and positions that are products of a thoroughgoing critical interrogation of 
our present conjuncture. Our withdrawal from theory-building has left the door open for 
banal empiricism to wander in unopposed and make itself at home. As Matthews (2010) 
himself has hinted, huge swathes of our discipline are now occupied by fact-finding or story-
telling empiricists who appear more interested in career-building, income-generation and 
supplying various political and cultural interest groups with ideological ammunition than they 
are in the pursuit of truth.  
 
Criminologists have largely failed to take a lead in explaining and solving the crucial 
problems we face today. These problems are too numerous to recount in full detail here, but 
for us the most notable are the imminent threat of ecological catastrophe, the power of global 
capital constantly to disrupt the ethical and socioeconomic lives of everyday people, the 
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growth of global criminal markets that operate off the statistical radar, and the growth of the 
securitisation apparatus. We seem unable to even properly tax the super-rich, let alone ensure 
economic participation for all or redistribute power and wealth. We have also seen the 
implosion of state governance in some locales (Mattei and Nader, 2008; Grayson, 2011; 
Silverstein, 2014; see also Currie, 2013), and the withering away of progressive sociability in 
a great many more (Winlow and Hall, 2013). Entrapment in this totalising market system is 
persuading many people at some difficult point in their lives to simply give up on the 
principles of trusting others and doing honest business (see Winlow, 2014; Antonopoulos and 
Hall, 2014).  
 
The harms that result from these combined processes are staggering to behold, but critical 
criminology has not yet managed to bring them into relief because it remains firmly rooted in 
social constructionism and its interminable relativistic analyses of ethics, language and 
epistemology. For many critical criminologists the default position continues to involve the 
dismissal of harm and the of redirection critical attention towards government and the 
oligarchs who control the mass media. Despite the sheer scale of the 2008 crash and the 
ongoing harms of ‘austerity’, twenty-first century critical criminology is, for the most part, 
resolutely idealist, and it cannot be persuaded to look again at the reality of our present way 
of life. We remain trapped in an epoch defined by the collapse and partial resurgence of 
abstract finance capitalism, a system which, we all know, redistributes wealth upwards, 
destroys welfare systems, corrupts democracy and casts growing numbers into debt peonage. 
The free hand of the market has created utter devastation in the physical and social 
environments but still processes of ‘labelling’, ‘stigmatisation’ and ‘othering’ preoccupy the 
criminological left. The leftist tradition of ideology critique is noticeable only by its absence, 
and there is little obvious desire to develop a new critical focus on global political economy 
and its deleterious outcomes (Sayer, 2015). We are generalising of course, but it makes no 
sense to deny critical criminology’s continued idealism and content ourselves with the 
conceit that we are doing a sterling job of identifying and explaining the social harms that are 
inevitable outcomes of the financialisation of the global economy, the corruption of our 
politics and the gradual corrosion of our social worlds. 
 
Matthews’ book seeks to respond to the general inertia of the discipline. In particular he 
hopes to move beyond the reductive and non-dialectical interplay between critical 
criminology and administrative criminology. For Matthews, there are productive seams still 
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to be mined, and if criminology is to progress it needs to move beyond the idealism of the left 
and the cynical pragmatism of the right by working through the new realist agenda he 
outlines in the book. The general framework he offers us owes much to the tradition of left 
realism, but the most important influence on Matthews’ thesis is the critical realism of Roy 
Bhaskar (2008a; 2008b), Margaret Archer (2004) and others. We discuss both of these 
traditions in the pages that follow. Matthews is one of the first criminologists to utilise this 
critical realism to any great degree. As a resolutely empirical discipline Anglo-European 
social science has scorned abstract theoretical models, especially those that seek to identify 
and grapple with intransitive forces that operate underneath language and interpretation. The 
refusal to engage with such models is a great shame because Bhaskar had much to teach us 
about everyday experience and its underlying contexts.  
 
Matthews does not talk in detail about critical realism, and he does not clearly identify which 
aspects of this quite substantial corpus are vital for the rejuvenation of our discipline. Instead 
he spends a significant portion of the book identifying the obvious limitations of the 
ubiquitous liberalism that dominates criminology today. Matthews pulls no punches, and he 
is brave enough to acknowledge that the anti-statist liberalism and libertarianism that is so 
common on criminology’s left-wing shares a common ideological root with the anti-
regulatory neoliberalism that has become totally dominant on the political right. He begins 
the book with an authoritative account of the development of modern criminology, which is 
all the more absorbing given that Matthews himself played a significant role in fracturing the 
criminological left during the nineteen eighties. Alongside a number of colleagues (see 
especially Matthews and Young, 1986; Lea and Young, 1993), he could no longer tolerate the 
naïve idealism, crude structuralism and political inefficacy of the radical social 
constructionism that had come to colonise leftist thought and politics. He proposed to build 
an innovative leftist account of the crime problem that, without diminishing the 
disproportionate harms caused by state and corporate crime, acknowledged the reality of the 
genuine harms that working class and minority criminality could inflict on victims.  
 
What Matthews attempts to do here is reconstruct left realism on a solid new epistemological 
foundation. In truth the British left realism of the 1980s couldn’t quite tear itself away from 
hard-line social constructionism and diluted cultural Marxism. Jock Young (2009), 
Matthews’ sometime collaborator, remained wedded to moral panic theory, a favourite 
concept amongst the social constructionists, despite having earlier expressed concern that it 
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was being overstated. In his later role as a cultural criminologist, Young tended to assume 
with the others influenced by the cultural Marxism of E. P. Thompson and Stuart Hall (see 
Dworkin, 1997; Winlow et al, 2015) that resistance to power was a timeless fact of life and 
an inexhaustible source of political energy. Others in the cultural criminology fold are now 
beginning to express serious doubts about the symbolic efficiency of the concept of organic 
resistance, but it still holds on to its place as one of the sub-discipline’s fundamental domain 
assumptions. 
 
Critical realism offers a far more solid and dependable intellectual base from which to 
proceed. Much of Matthews’ book is pitched as a critique of contemporary criminology, and 
he should be warmly congratulated for slaughtering a few of criminology’s sacred cows with 
surgical precision. To simplify his position, he believes that realist criminology must be 
policy relevant, avoid the idealism of a radical left that lost its way in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
it was absorbed by the powerful anti-statist liberal and libertarian currents that became 
dominant at the time, and progress incrementally by producing new theoretical insights and 
empirical data. We support the overall principle of moving forward, especially the need for 
criminology’s internal production of new theoretical concepts that can help to explain the 
criminological phenomena that appear in today’s world. However, we have a number of 
problems with the way he wants to initiate this new and crucial progressive movement in 
criminological thought. First, we have a problem with his conceptualisation of both ‘realism’ 
and ‘idealism’. Second – and this follows on from the problem of defining realism – we 
fundamentally disagree with the emphasis Matthews’ places upon ‘policy relevance’. Third, 
we are not convinced that empiricism can perform the leading role that he envisages. Fourth, 
Matthews offers a strange defence of capitalist ‘consumerism’ in which he fails to make the 
crucial distinction between consumption and consumer culture (see Hall et al., 2008). This, 
we will argue, is a fatal error that kills off the possibility of constructing a new realist 
criminology that can effectively criticise and suggest alternatives to the destructive and 
criminogenic way of life we lead today. 
 
 
Left realism - initial problems 
Fraser (2013) argues that feminism had lost much of its radical appeal by the turn of the 
millennium and was all too easily assimilated by neoliberalism’s competitive-individualist 
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culture. However, feminism’s initial impact on criminology was nevertheless a game-
changer. By emphasising the crucial point that some crime represents an experience of real 
harm lived by human beings and is not merely a social construct exaggerated by the media 
for political purposes, feminist criminologists performed the valuable task of returning leftist 
criminology’s objects of crime and harm to the foreground and reconnecting them to 
experiential reality.  
 
The emergence of left realism in Britain in the mid-1980s was a culmination of critical 
thinking about the inherent flaws of left idealism and other mainstream criminological 
theories. Currie’s (1985) and Young’s (1986) early contributions were seminal. However, 
although left idealism’s most prominent flaw was the neglect of the reality of crime as 
experienced by victims, the emergence of left realism also appears to have been, at least 
partially, a reaction to the success right-realist criminology had achieved in its lobbying of 
the US and UK governments from the 1970s. Right realists had always focused on victims, 
but it was a superficial and populist focus that completely failed to take into account the 
crimes of the powerful or analyse the complex conditions that underlie trends in crime and 
harm (Hall and Wilson, 2014). Left realists acknowledged that the crimes of the powerful had 
not been properly addressed and that some aspects of law and criminal justice were biased 
against the working class, but they also took the crucial progressive step of admitting that 
most petty crime was intra-class. In other words most of it was committed by working-class 
people against other working-class people (see Schwartz and DeKeseredy, 1991). 
 
These were the salutary lessons provided by the US and UK victim surveys of the 1980s. 
Even the partial glimpse of reality provided by orthodox empiricism revealed the flaws of 
left-idealist critical criminology. Critical criminology’s weak theorisation of intra-class crime 
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and absence of suggestions for policy allowed right realism to dominate. Left realism 
attempted to correct this problem by constructing a more realistic theory of crime by focusing 
on the harms victims experience in their locales and analysing them in the ‘square of crime’ 
(see for example Lea, 1987, 1992). This new theoretical framework was made up of four 
interactive relational parts: the victim, the offender, the reaction of the public and the reaction 
of the state’s agencies. If fractious relations between these four major players could be 
improved, it may be possible to reduce crime without increased securitisation.  
 
In the 1990s left realism appears to have had a small amount influence on the Blair and 
Clinton governments. However, repairing relations in the square of crime did little to 
alleviate the underlying economic and cultural conditions which seemed to have probabilistic 
causal relationships to crime and harm. Left realism challenged the domination of social 
constructionism on the left and called for positive policy interventions. However, the policies 
that were suggested simply did not go deep enough to reshape late capitalism’s underlying 
criminogenic conditions. As we all know, eventually the right won the argument with their 
securitisation and incarceration agendas and the left’s influence waned. 
 
Despite this failure, Matthews argues that criminology should build on left realism’s positive 
gains by incorporating critical realism. We agree with this, but the fundamental problem we 
have is that Matthews gets this project off on the wrong footing by inverting the concepts of 
the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’. He posits depth intervention as a form of ‘idealism’, but he 
understands this not as philosophical or ethical idealism but impossible utopianism. He then 
insists that we should restrict ourselves to ‘realism’, but in reality he understands this 
‘realism’ to be a form of pragmatism, in this case piecemeal policy reforms in the context of 
liberal-parliamentary capitalism. Matthews’ argument therefore rests on two fundamental 
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category errors made by confusing idealism with utopianism and realism with pragmatism. 
As we have argued at length (see Winlow and Hall, 2013), to assume that our current mode 
of living will simply continue on unopposed is not realism and it is not pragmatism. The cold 
hard facts of the matter are clear: we simply cannot go on as we are. To believe that we can is 
a form of utopianism, whereas the standard utopian response, which is to argue that we must 
intervene at a deep level to set history on a new course, is in fact entirely reasonable and 
anything but ‘utopian’. 
 
This categorical shift allows Matthews to avoid the fundamental political question at the heart 
of realist criminology: what depth of political intervention is required to create the conditions 
in which harmful crime can be significantly reduced without reliance on securitisation? 
Matthews has pre-empted this fundamental question, moving us further away from genuine 
critical realism and closer to the administrative pragmatism. He wants realist criminology to 
be ‘policy relevant’, but shouldn’t we to brave enough to acknowledge that neoliberal 
political parties – which, these days, means virtually every political party in the mainstream – 
have no interest in learning about what works in the reduction of crime and harm? Only 
policy suggestions that identify a reduction in state spending and the involvement of the 
market appear have any chance of being picked up by western governments these days, a 
trend which fosters policy-based research rather than research-based policy and further 
corrodes the values of both the university and ‘objective’ social scientific research. 
 
We cannot begin to speak about the amelioration of harms without a realistic appraisal of our 
current situation and the forces and processes that underlie it. Although some left realists still 
write with critical depth (see for example Lea, 2002), the left realist movement as a whole 
faltered as it moved forward into the nineties and became something of a compromise 
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position between critical criminology and administrative criminology. It became 
progressively bogged down in its administrative role of providing neoliberal governments 
with pragmatic alternatives to the right realist strategies of securitisation and incarceration, an 
unwinnable game played out in front of a public who wanted quick results. Even gestures 
towards long-term projects of transforming underlying structures and processes became 
potentially discrediting to a left-realism committed to pragmatism; it had made its bed and 
had to lie on it. 
 
An injection of genuine critical realism could have revived left realism. The principle that 
deep political intervention was impossible had already been established (see Lea and Young, 
1993), and left realism became ensnared by the negative ideology of capitalist realism (see 
Fisher, 2009), the new liberal-postmodernist ideology that has convinced the vast majority 
that no fundamental alternative to capitalism is feasible. The triumph of capitalist realism has 
been so complete that even traditional social democratic reforms – such as publicly controlled 
investment, progressive taxation, nationalised major industries, state-run health and secular 
education – now appear extreme and remote from the reality in which we live (Winlow and 
Hall, 2013). Left realism’s pragmatism also left it with little choice but to adopt standard 
legal definitions of crime, which of course ignore broader and deeper harms. Thus it 
contributed little to the debate on whether the legal categories of ‘crime’ properly represent 
the harms inflicted on ordinary people and their environments. Because major structural and 
systemic problems remained beyond its scope it had little to say about reform beyond 
criminal justice agencies and local communities. Left realism boxed itself into a corner 
because it inappropriately redefined realism as the pragmatism that limits itself to what can 
be done within existing structural and systemic restraints. Simultaneously, by confusing true 
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realism with impossible idealism, it severely narrowed its analytical scope and became 
unable to address what must be done to transform underlying criminogenic conditions. 
 
Problems with empiricism 
Matthews’ blueprint for a new realism relies on an empirical platform. While it is unfair to 
portray empiricism as intrinsically useless, on its own, without the guidance of sophisticated 
theoretical concepts relevant to the times in which we live, it can be intellectually and 
politically toxic. Without relevant concepts it is too easily deployed in the task of reproducing 
rather than transforming current conditions. Hypothetically, the task of empirically testing 
broad, deep and sophisticated theories is not impossible, but in practical terms it is too 
expensive and impractical, or it is politically unpalatable. Whereas extreme social 
constructionism promotes political inertia by obscuring reality and transforming the vital task 
of conceptualisation into an endless language game, post-structuralism insists that meaning is 
always contingent and reality can never really be represented, except perhaps for the shortest 
time in the most localised space. Matthews is right to reject this obfuscation, but the 
expensive and unwieldy empirical method is not necessarily the most reliable way forward. 
 
All empirical projects are subject to prior political agendas. ‘Value-free’ empirical science is 
a myth, and criminology’s research agenda is inextricably tied to existing political positions, 
the domain assumptions of which insist that we accept their various beliefs about human 
nature, morality, freedom, authority, harm and the role of the state in our lives (Hall and 
Winlow, 2015). What should be more interesting to social scientists, however, are the 
repressed experiences and views of Baudrillard’s (2007) ‘silent majority’, those who have 
little or no representation or influence upon current political agendas. The experiences of the 
‘silent majority’ are filtered through dominant ideologies and either denied clear symbolic 
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expression by constructionists or always fragmented and misrepresented by empiricists. 
Empiricism is an ideological mercenary that can serve any political purpose, and thus, on its 
own, without a thorough and sophisticated re-conceptualisation of the experiences and 
underlying contexts of everyday life, cannot provide the platform for a new criminological 
realism. 
 
In the absence of the will to re-conceptualise everyday experiential life and its contexts 
through the lenses of both minorities and the silent majority, the open debate on precisely 
how deep reforms must go, and which reforms are likely to have any significant and durable 
impact on criminality, harm and securitisation, which should be the epicentre of social 
science, is impossible. This is the task of theoretical criminology, but it is now perfectly clear 
that theory has been marginalised in the discipline. To begin the task of reconceptualization 
theoretical criminology must first recognize our current representations and models of the 
social world – with its phenomena, events, values, norms and power relations – as effects 
rather than causes.  Causes operate in far deeper and very complex processes organised by the 
fundamental fantasy that drives the subjective agent and the fundamental logic that drives and 
organises the interactions between the psyche, culture and the socioeconomic system.  
 
Matthews also has difficulty in recognizing the unavoidable fact that by far the most 
influential context for the configuration and reproduction of the fundamental fantasy, and by 
extension late-capitalist subjectivity, is consumer culture (Hall et al., 2008; Smart, 2010; 
Moxon, 2011; Miles, 2014). He refuses to accept the incorporation of the silent majority into 
the subjectivising symbolic circuits of consumer culture and the permanent distraction of 
potential political energy. In contemporary consumer culture the majority seek their status 
and construct their identities, yet this is consistently denied by those on the left who hang 
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onto obsolete conceptions of ‘autonomous’ subjectivity. Matthews (2014) goes one step 
further by claiming that ‘consumerism’ is one of capitalism’s great benefits, the saving grace 
of an otherwise oppressive socioeconomic system. According to Matthews, when capitalism 
is one day transformed by accumulated pragmatic reforms, consumerism should take its place 
as a fundamental right, a great gift to the people.  
 
This is populist rhetoric born a fundamental misunderstanding of what consumer culture is 
and what it has done to human relations and processes of identity formation (see Hayward, 
2012).  As such it is the weakest aspect of Matthews’ overall argument. Matthews confuses 
consumption with consumerism, and he then continues on down this intellectual dead-end to 
make a series of quite significant mistakes that detract from the more edifying aspects of the 
book. Matthews sees only good things in consumerism. He can see no problem in the way 
consumer culture stimulates myriad false needs, its tendency to make individuals feel 
inadequate or incomplete, and its role in mediating social relationships and driving new 
exclusions and forms of discrimination (see, for example, Hayward and Yar, 2006). He has 
no issue with the vacuity of commodified forms of culture that exist solely to sell, or with 
consumer symbolism’s role in the depoliticisation of the working class and the displacement 
and erosion of the collective identity-building once sourced in class, community, locality, 
family and history. The inability to distinguish between consumption and consumerism also 
hampers our understanding of important changes within our global economic system, most 
notably western de-industrialisation and the growth of new eastern industrial economies built 
upon production for export to a west now populated by debt-laden consumers. His idealistic 
pragmatism and faith in the benefits of consumerism must come as cold comfort for those 
workers forced to toil in appalling conditions in sweatshops across the east. The appearance 
of a global precariat in mega-slums serviced by failed states (Davis, 2007), the degradation of 
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our eco-system and the depletion of our natural resources (Klare, 2008, 2012; Heinberg, 
2011), impending resource wars and enforced population movements (Klare, 2002), 
burgeoning criminal markets in cyber-space (Treadwell, 2012) and the other problems that 
await future generations simply do not appear on the radar of the sort of ‘realist’ project 
Matthews advocates.  
 
Why we need ultra-realism 
At the moment, liberal-left sociology and criminology are limited to the study of effects or 
symptoms as either constructions or mid-range causes rather than indicators of what might lie 
beneath them. Matthews is right that the only way to get down to causes is a potentially 
potent realist project. However, even the brief critiques presented here suggest that the 
pragmatism and empiricism he advocates – especially in a context shorn of the most 
important cultural current in late modernity – are not nearly strong enough as a platform on 
which such a project can be built. 
 
For us, if such a platform is to be built it is first necessary to restart the theoretical machinery 
that was shut down by both mainstream and critical criminology in the post-war period. We 
would contend that Matthews’ ambition of a new critical realist criminology can come to 
fruition only in a framework of what we call ultra-realism (see Hall and Winlow, 2015). 
Empiricist criminology is trapped in the superficial realm of phenomena and, along with 
interpretivists and post-structuralists, its advocates tend to discourage theorisation of depth 
structures and generative processes. One further problem is that it cannot provide us with a 
sense of absence, which, as we shall see shortly, is also causative at the deep level.  
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Of course, anyone who advocates a return to realism has to contend with the problem that 
realism in general has a rather bad name. One reason behind this is the dominance of varieties 
of cynical realism in popular culture, politics, philosophy and social sciences. These positions 
transhistoricize and essentialize the very worst of human propensities and tacitly support the 
politics of conservatism and classical liberalism. Their cynicism and essentialism is such that 
they make socioeconomic transformation look either unwise or impossible. Conservativism’s 
rigid, pessimistic Old Testament view of the human being as an intrinsically wicked sinner is 
often given pseudo-scientific credibility by the ethological conception of the human as a 
‘killer ape’ (Dart, 1953). The timeless sinner is in need of constant discipline and punishment 
by traditional institutions bolstered by the rational-technological forces of modernity. Most 
conservative control theories are grounded in this myth, and neoclassical right realism differs 
only in its myth of the wicked human being as a rational calculating individual that power can 
force into adopting modes of self-government.  
 
Liberal-postmodernism has its own version of cynical realism. In art, cinema, literature, 
music and many forms of youth culture on the ‘street’ we can detect the powerful current of 
depressive realism. Well-known examples include the works of French novelist Michel 
Houellebecq and American novelist Brett Easton-Ellis (Jeffery, 2011). Redolent of capitalist 
realism, which systematically persuades young people that no change is possible in their 
lifetime, depressive realism supplies us with a narrative of late-modern degeneration –  
selfishness, nihilism and the futility and exhaustion of life at the dystopian end of history. It’s 
rather sobering that all the left can place in opposition to this edifice of conservative and 
postmodernist cynicism is the rather ailing left idealism of the 60s-vintage ‘new left’. Left 
idealism was Young’s (1975) term for this influential movement, but it is a misnomer. 
Underneath the idealism represented in symbolic interplay lies a disavowed naturalistic 
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realism, the naïve assumption that the human being is always orientated to creativity, 
transgression and the struggle for social justice, the mirror image of conservatism’s 
wickedness, the opposing view that can be allowed into liberalism’s intellectual clearing 
house for the sake of balance and the perpetuation of eternal hope amidst permanent political 
inaction. Both positions are unable to deal with the sheer diversity of human drives, desires 
and actions. 
 
Critical realism, as Matthews points out, presents criminology with a genuinely alternative 
theoretical framework. Most critical realists claim that some measured empirical observation 
is useful, as is the acknowledgement of human meaning and the causal power of agency, but 
they stress that there is far more to social life and its dynamic relations and forces. Roy 
Bhaskar (1997), critical realism’s main architect, argued that positivism-empiricism can 
reveals the regular recurrence of events but not the underlying structures, powers, forces and 
processes that influence the way events occur. These deep dynamics are never fully revealed 
or represented by empirically observable events. This is especially true in the criminological 
field, where the systematic concealment and incompleteness of events is the norm. Empirical 
research projects are always preceded by the initial construction of concepts and hypotheses 
that to a large extent predetermine what researchers will find. Perhaps homicide statistics 
have a modicum of validity and reliability (Hall and McLean, 2009), but it is difficult to 
make this claim about anything else in criminology. Empiricism might be useful in 
conceptualising what we mean by ‘crime’ and ‘harm’, but it cannot help us to reveal the 
drives, processes and structures, and indeed their very real consequences, that exist 
independently of empirical knowledge and the current theoretical frameworks that are in 
thrall to ‘empirical testing’. In fact we might suspect that our devotion to empiricism and our 
alternative devotion to constructionism can be seen as different but complementary ways of 
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deliberately avoiding any contact with underlying drives, processes and structures (see Hall 
and Winlow, 2015).  
 
However, critical realism is not a deterministic doctrine. Most critical realists insist that we 
retain the ontological distinctiveness of the individual and the social while we apply our 
efforts to the analysis of their relatedness. The standard proposition is ontological realism in 
the intransitive realm of independent structures, processes and powers combined with a 
qualified epistemological relativism in the transitive realm of things that are the products of 
our knowledge and activity. We must accept that real power places constraints on our 
knowledge and activities because the ‘thing-like’ quality of structures, processes and forces 
in the intransitive realm. There are no universal laws, but under certain structural and 
processual conditions there are probabilistic tendencies. For instance, the disruption of settled 
socioeconomic communities by neoliberal restructuring will tend to increase crime, harm and 
social unrest. Such consequences are to a large extent predictable and supported by historical 
analysis. The process is of course mediated by human beings and their ability to construct 
meaning and act as moral agents in the world, but to suggest that action is free from either 
ideological or forceful restraint is naïve. 
 
Nevertheless, critical realism focuses on the relationship between agency, structure and 
causation in a changing world. Agency can reproduce structures and processes but also has 
the potential to transform them. However, as we act within them, they feed back and 
influence what we do. Structure is more than an ideational ‘concept’, therefore we must move 
beyond social constructionism and postmodernism. Most contemporary constructionist 
positions, such as Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, are balanced between agency and 
structure, but truncate and compress both into the mid-range ‘actual’ level whilst putting too 
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much faith in the powers of individual agents to act with collective efficacy. Thus we 
consistently overestimate the influence our ethics, meanings and limited voluntary actions 
can exert on deep structural forces, processes and structures.  
 
Neoliberalism’s market logic restricts us as long as we remain enmeshed in it and our 
livelihoods remain dependent upon it. We can invent a humanised form of neoliberalism in 
our heads and dream of alternatives, but we cannot reduce its forces, processes and structures 
to norms, rules, conventions, speech-acts and language. Firmly established institutions have 
the power to influence things in the material world: think, for instance, of the probabilistic 
relationships between neoliberal politics, globalisation, risky investment banking, austerity, 
burgeoning criminal markets, social unrest and repressive securitisation. Critical realism can 
help criminology to home in on the fundamental forces, processes and structures that lie 
underneath criminological phenomena. However, if it were to be integrated into 
criminological theory and applied to its full potential, it’s doubtful that its analyses would 
support the sort of mid-range policy initiatives that Matthews calls for.  It would be far more 
likely to tell us that things run far deeper and require correspondingly deeper political 
intervention. 
 
Critical realism is also useful in that it sees absence as causative. For instance, in the absence 
of a functioning welfare system and/or the politics of solidarity amongst working people, 
there is a high probability that criminal markets would expand and harmful crime would 
increase. Human agents can of course change their social worlds for the better, as long as 
they are actually acting on real underlying forces, processes and structures rather than simply 
gesturing towards them. Whereas positivist-empiricism can detect only the symptoms, social 
constructionists and postmodernists dissolve the reality of these forces in language and 
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discourse, while orthodox structural Marxists dissolve subjectivity in outdated notions of 
ideology as the obfuscation of truth or the hegemonic ‘manufacture of consent’. 
 
Critical realists assume that human agents are relatively autonomous but insist that they must 
understand ontology before they understand epistemology. Idealist positions such as 
interpretivism, social constructionism, discourse theory and post-structuralism are premature 
and deal with only one dimension of human existence. We can talk, but with little knowledge 
of the forces that act beneath everyday life we have little of substance to talk about. By 
ignoring deep forces, social science restricts itself to symptomology rather than aetiology 
(Hall, 2012a). For Bhaskar (2008a), three ontological dimensions of social reality are 
amenable to epistemology, agency and political intervention: 
 
1. The empirical dimension (phenomenological experiences of knowing subjects) 
2. The actual dimension (real events and subjective experiences) 
3. The real dimension (underlying generative mechanisms that cause the events that are 
open to experience) 
 
This depth realism opens up an intransitive dimension beneath empiricism, subjective 
knowledge and ethical imperatives. Increasing our knowledge of deep structures allows us to 
make better judgements about the validity of competing knowledge-claims and proposed 
political interventions. To act effectively we need to have some idea of what lies beneath our 
social conversations, social relations and subjective interests, no matter how complex, 
shifting and daunting it might be. Critical realism’s objective is to dig beneath empirical 
realism (positivism and empiricism), transcendental idealism (hermeneutics, interpretivism, 
constructionism) and social-relational dynamics (conflict theory, Marxism, feminism) to 
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ground knowledge in deep structures, processes and generative mechanisms. It is not, as 
Matthews suggests, simply to suggest pragmatic policy suggestions. 
 
Critical realism is not deterministic. It acknowledges that causes must involve social actions 
performed by human agents, but it is also aware that most social actions are unconscious, 
routine or enforced. Therefore causality cannot be understood solely by the analysis of actors’ 
conscious meanings as they express them in a language limited by ideology. Thus we need to 
develop deeper and more sophisticated conceptualisations of the contexts in which human 
meanings and actions are generated, systematised and reproduced. To do this Bhaskar steps 
into line with Giddens (1984) by relying on a dualistic model of structure and agency in 
which the two categories are ontologically different. However, in his dialectical turn Bhaskar 
(2008b) moves beyond Giddens’s naïve notion of ‘iterative practices’ by arguing that only 
when agentic action is informed by deep knowledge of structures and generative processes 
can it have any real transformative potential. Bhaskar uses the concept of an interdependent 
totality to explain why human agents who seek to transform the social world must be 
practical at the same time as being aware of their connectedness with others in a single 
system of totalising relations. He agrees with Marx that an agent’s actions can become real, 
ethical and political only when they are orientated to the practical activities that configure the 
total system. As we have seen, Matthews’s uncritical acceptance of ‘consumerism’ does not 
show this awareness of the totality of socioeconomic relations in a global economy, or the 
parts the consumer economy and consumer culture play in the underlying generative 
mechanisms important to the criminological field of enquiry. 
 
As we have seen, critical realists acknowledge the fact that absence can be transformative; it 
can truly change the nature of a thing. The human agent can trigger such transformative 
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absence by simply refusing to participate in the totalising system of interdependent practices, 
which is the principle behind forms of non-violent resistance, such as strikes etc. (Žižek, 
2008). Our lives could be positively transformed by removing, say, stockpiles of weapons, 
corrupt politicians, large corporations or the private right to create debt-generated capital… 
or even the sociosymbolic status attached to luxury consumer items and the desire to own 
them. On the other hand, harmful transformations could be brought about by removing social 
recognition and nurturing, democratic politics, human rights, intellectual life and education, 
livelihoods, stable communities, welfare support and so on. However, not all of this negative 
causation takes place in the mid-range of governmental policy that Mathews relies on; much 
of it runs far deeper. 
 
Despite all of this, we should not imagine that critical realism as it stands is a panacea for 
criminology. There are numerous flaws, and one of the most important is Bhaskar’s 
simplified view of the ‘negative’, which does not take into account Hegel’s well-known 
double negative, the negation of the negation. Both Adorno (1990) and Žižek (1993) have 
argued that this important concept provides us with one of the main reasons why 
transformative absences tend not to be put into practice. The capitalist system, with its totality 
of interdependent relations and unavoidable systemic imperatives, imposes on its populations 
– or at least those with something to lose – the compulsory refusal to refuse. Instead, when 
situations demand it, we just do things – including crime and harm – because nobody seems 
willing or able to make the sacrifices necessary to make the first moves towards an 
alternative. The system is geared up to make the political act of negation virtually impossible 
because refusal to participate in some way would be disastrous for individuals who have no 
independent means of support.  
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The impossibility of using refusal and negation to invoke causal absence works on two levels. 
First, it is impractical because capitalism’s system of interdependencies is set up make us all 
an offer we can’t refuse, at least if we hope to ensure our basic material and social survival. 
Second, consumer culture is set up to create a fantasised sense of absence and convert it into 
desire for consumer objects that carry vital sociosymbolic significance for individuals whose 
traditional sources of identity are receding into history (Hall et al, 2008; Winlow and Hall, 
2013). The permanent postponement of the power of negation is vital to the system’s 
reproduction. Speculative realists argue that in the current Anthropocene age many of the 
deleterious effects that impact on the world are caused by us rather than nature. Therefore, we 
hold the power to negate these disasters and become the architects of our own fate (Žižek, 
2010). For instance, criminal markets would not burgeon so rapidly in the developing world 
with stronger democratic states and control of resources, which are both denied by neoliberal 
financial power, but to refuse the demands of neoliberal economic restructuring, as the Greek 
case appears set to demonstrated, is almost impossible. 
 
Many of the changes in the trends of crime, harm and securitisation in the 21st century are 
effects of Anthropocene disasters – global warming and enforced population migration, 
resource wars, environmental pollution, financial crashes, rapid industrialisation and chaotic 
urbanisation, rapid deindustrialisation and urban decay, unemployment, the technological 
destruction of livelihoods, the marketizaton of culture and so on. Speculative realists argue 
that we must look upon these disasters and their consequences without optimism, as 
contingent realities in a cold world, but we must also reflect seriously on our role in their 
causation and speculate freely on how things could be different should we choose to change 
our way of doing things. Unfortunately this is not the sort of depth speculation that 
Matthews’ pragmatic realism would advocate, and demonstrates that the deeper and more 
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realistic realism goes the more likely it is to be misconceived by pragmatists as impossible 
idealism or utopianism. 
 
However, speculative realism shares a fundamental problem with the other forms of realism 
we have discussed so far; their separation of agency from structure means they have little to 
say about subjectivity’s active and willing role in disasters and their consequences. They 
cannot explain why subjects seem unable to learn from their mistakes, and why they are 
willing to risk the infliction of harm on others and their environments in order to reproduce 
the current socioeconomic system and further their interests within it. In the act of separating 
out and absolving human beings, critical realism’s dualism of agency and structure to some 
extent still reifies abstract forces and exonerates the individual. Žižek (passim) provides us 
with a more illuminating view of the subject’s relation to the capitalist socioeconomic 
system. He reminds us rather harshly that we are already aware of the intransitive realm and 
know enough about it to act politically, and we consistently encounter realistic speculation 
about the problems we cause and alternative ways of doing things. But we repress this true 
knowledge and sink back into a culture of comfortable acceptance. We systematically avoid 
Hegel’s politically effective universal truth, the concrete universal, which could provide our 
speculative knowledge real substance (Žižek, 2000). The concrete universal truth is known to 
some extent by most of us. It is felt experientially on an everyday basis. Myriad concrete 
universal representations of the totality exist ‘down there’ amongst those who regularly 
experience the deleterious consequences of the system’s disasters (see Hall, 2012b). ‘Up 
there’, the corridors of power in business and post-political administration are shot through 
with knowledge of abstract processes and their related concrete universals. For instance, in 
J.Q. Wilson’s Thinking About Crime (1975) he revealed that at the time the US government 
knew perfectly well that the impending restructuring of the economy in the abrupt move to 
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neoliberalism would cause social unrest, increased crime rates and the popular perception of 
the need for increased securitisation. 
 
Harmful crime, violence, intimidation, victimhood, cynicism, nihilism and the destruction of 
communities are some of the substantive criminological elements of the abject concrete 
universal that is vital to a renewed realist criminological research project. We must concern 
ourselves with the individuals who suffer most in the wake of capitalism’s disasters, the 
victims of its corporate and political crimes but also of the crimes of the cynical predatory 
individuals who live amongst them and take advantage of their subjugation and vulnerability. 
To bring the concrete universal into sharper relief, we suggest a move to an ultra-realist 
criminology that uses unsentimental ethnographies contextualised by advanced theoretical 
frameworks founded upon conceptions of subjectivity and ideology provided by new 
continental philosophy (see Hall and Winlow, 2015). Ultra-realist criminology would move 
beyond left realism’s inherent pragmatism and critical realism’s flawed conception of 
subjectivity. As a first step towards the construction of a philosophical basis for ultra-realist 
criminology, we have to accept that Bhaskar’s naturalistic metaphor for subjectivity does not 
work. There is no natural human essence of love and creativity, but, as Adorno (2000) 
reminded us, it can be cultivated in a nurturing society. For Lacan and Žižek, the ‘essence’ of 
human subjectivity is, paradoxically, a non-essential void of conflicting drives, not a natural 
and inexhaustible Bergsonian ‘élan vital’ (see Hall, 2012b). Our potential to be loving and 
creative is always offset by an equal potential to be hateful, prejudiced, apathetic or nihilistic. 
The material core of the human being is anxious, contingent, flexible, unpredictable and 
susceptible to obscene enjoyment.  
 
 
23 
 
Roberts and Joseph (2005) argue that Bhaskar’s real dimension is fully human, not 
independent of the subject. For Žižek, what connects the subject to the real is an ideological 
fantasy comprised of sublime consumer objects, which again indicates just how much 
Matthews’  dismissal of advanced capitalism’s prominent cultural form hampers the move to 
realist criminological investigation. These objects are variations of the master signifier of the 
commodity, which constitutes the dynamic relation between subjectivity and capitalism’s 
system of relentless commodification and competitive individualism. Where Matthews’ 
mistake is to ignore consumer culture and subjectivity entirely, critical realism’s mistake is to 
separate out subjectivity as the naturally ethical and creative agent. Žižek’s (2008) useful 
insight is that the social and economic processes in the intransitive realm that seem to act 
independently of our knowledge and activity are at the very deepest level a product of 
historically accumulated actions that are routinely made unconscious. We really know about 
what we have done, what we are doing and – as J.Q. Wilson’s example above shows – what 
we are about to do. In other words, we know a lot about the intransitive realm and we have 
done for some time. Each day we consciously act to reproduce it, but we fetishistically deny 
our collusion in our own actions and repress it into our unconscious. Therefore the 
unconscious, the deep psychic realm of repressed symbols, is not created by external 
repressive forces imposed on us from above. We create it ourselves by constantly choosing to 
repress specific aspects of what we know, which allows us to continue to act in ways that 
reproduce the system; we persistently choose our own unconscious into being. Constantly 
deconstructing ‘meaning’ is of little use when each day we choose to fetishistically disavow 
and render unconscious the crucial elements of what we already know.  
 
The constant act of fetishistic disavowal that characterises the agent’s inability to act and its 
tendency to either passively accept or actively conform to the aggressive and competitive 
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practices that reproduce the system and inflict harm on others has huge implications for 
criminological research and theory. Unforgiving interpersonal competition, inequality, 
separatism, racism, sexism, fraud, corruption, violence, securitisation and punitiveness are 
merely some of the crude visible symptoms that lie on the surface of the complex of 
underlying forces activated by the system’s constant provocation of the subject’s anxiety and 
obscene enjoyment. Matthews in unerringly right that we need to move beyond both critical 
criminology and administrative criminology. However, his truncated mid-range form of 
realism-as-pragmatism cannot escape the problems inherent in empiricism, liberal 
assumptions of subjectivity and consumer culture’s capture of human energy and desire, 
which endlessly distracts individuals and postpones vital political interventions. For 
criminology to begin its investigation of the forces and processes that underlie life in 
advanced capitalism requires a move beyond both left realism and critical realism to ultra-
realism.  
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